The anom~y detection problem can be formtiated as one of learning to characterize the behaviom of an individud, system, or network in terms of temporal sequences of dic rete data. We present an approach to this problem based on instance based learning (IBL) techniques. To cast the anom~y detection task in an IBL framework, we employ an approach that transforms temporal sequences of discrete, unordered observations into a metric space via a similarity measure that encodes intra-attribute dependence=. Classification boundaries are selected from an a posterior characterization of the v&d user's behaviors, coupled with a dm ain heuristic. An empirical evrduation of the approach on user command data demonstratees that we can accurately differentiate the profled user from alternative users when the avdable featura encode sticient information. Futherrnore, we demonstrate that the system detects anomalous conditions quickly -an important qufity for reducing potential damage by a mdcious user. We present several techniques for reducing the data storage requirements of the user profle, including instance selection methods and clustering. An empirical evahtation shows that a new greedy clustering dgonthm reduces the size of the user model by 70% with ordy a smd loss in accuracy. A comparison of the greedy clustering technique to clustering with K-centers shows that greedy clustering is preferable in terms of accuracy and computation time for this domain.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the problem of anom~y detection as one of learning to characterize the behaviors of an individud, system, or network in terms of tempor~sequences of discrete data. Mthough we focus here on user oriented anomaly detection at the level of she~command input, the methods we present are gener~zable to learning on arbitrary streams of discrete events such as GUI events, network packet traffic, or system cd traces.
The anomaly detection problem is a diffidt one, especi~y at the level of user command traces. It encompasses a Permission tomake di@tal or hard copies of all or part of this \vork for personal or classroom use is~nted tvithout fee provided that copies arc not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otheniise, to republish, to post on sen,ers or to redistribute to lists. requires prior sQecilicpermission arrdlora fee. 5th Conference on Computer& Communications Security San Francisco CA USA Copyright AChl 19981-581 134074/98/11...S5.00 150 broad spectrum of possibtities, from a trusted system user turning from legitimate usage to abuse of system r~ources, to system penetration by sophisticated and careti hostfle outsiders, to onetime use by a c~worker 'borrowing' a workstation, to automated penetrations launched by a relatively naive attacker via a scripted attack sequence. Time spans of interest vary from a few seconds to months. Patterns may appear ordy in data gathered from a number of different hosts and networks, possibly spread over thousands of des geographicdy.
The amount of available data to sift through can be ttiy staggering, as security officers may be responsible for overviewing thousands of hosts, each of which can generate megabytes of audit data per hour. Se Iection of the data sources of interest can dso be dificrdt. Do the patterns of interest evidence themselves most clearly in command data, system cd traces, network activity logs, CPU load averages, disk access patterns, or any of the hundreds of other possible sources? The pattern of interest may be corrupted by noise or interspersed with examples of normal system usage. Indeed, normal usage may vary greatly as the user changes tasks or software and learns new behaviors and command actions. Differentiating innocuous anom&es from those associated with actual abuse, misuse, or intrusion is a further diffidty.
On top of W of these diffictdties, a practical security system must be accurate; f&e alarms~fl reduce user cotidence in the system while f~ely accepting anomalous or hostile activities wiH render the system useless.
Subsets of the general problem have been addressed by speci~zed techniques. Short term ('hit and run') attacks and attacks launched by automated scripts can often be detected by pattern matching to databases of known attack patterns (for example,~um95, SCCCt96]). Similarly, there are numerous free and commercial programs for detecting the presence of known tierabihties and viruses by signatures,~V95, Gor96].
We are interested in the subset of anomaly detection oriented to longer term patterns, in which hewn misuse signatures are insufficient to distinguish the space of possible anomrdies. This subset covers not ordy intrusions but &o hostile activities by a trusted user and even relatively 'innocuous' pohcy violations such as inappropriate use of system resources by an authorized user. We take a machine learning viewpoint of this problem, in which the task is to train a classifier with known 'normal' data to distinguish norrna behaviors from anomalous. The field of machine learning (and artifici~intefigence, in general) is strongly motivated by pattern detection and analysis problems and possesses many techniques for different pattern recognition problems.
To approach anomaly detection as a machine learning task, we must define both the learning model and reprs entationd format for the input data. We hypothesize that temporal interactions carry a si@cant amount of identifying information, and so our learning model shodd explicitly examine such interaction. We present a source independent representation that encodes some temporal aspects of a data stream.
One poptiar and higtiy general class of machine learning techniques is instance based learning (IBL), [AKA91] . In this model, the concept of interest is implicitly represented by a set of instances that exemphfy the concept (the instance dictionary).
A new instance is classified according to its relation to stored instances. A typical scheme is k-nearestneighbor classhcation, in which a new instance is given the label of the majority of the k dictionary instances closest to it, where 'closest' is a domain specific measure but is often taken to be the Euchdean distance. IBL techniques may be contrasted to learning techniques that btid exphcit modek of the data, such as summary statistics or decision trees [Qui93] .
Some work is required to adapt the anomaly detection task to the IBL learning framework. In particdar, we need to settle on a fixed-length vector (feature vector) representation of the data and to define the concept of 'closeness' or similarity of two vectors. We *O need a different decision process than the poptiar nearest-neighbor ties.
Because the space of possible mdciow behaviors and intruder actions is Dotentidv infinite. it is imDracticd to characterize .
. .
normal behavior as a contrast to known abnormal behaviom. It is *O dmirable, for privacy reasons, that an user based anomaly detection agent ordy employ data that originates with the profled user or is pubhcly avtiable. This require ment leads to a learning situation in which ody positive instances are av~able. Learning from positive examples ody presents a ch~enge for classification as it can easily lead to overgenerfization [Iba79] . A widely acknowledged diffidty with instance based learning techniques is the overhead incurred by exphcitly storing a set of class exemplars. In a dynamic environment with no fixed set of training data, such as anomaly detection, the size of the instance dictionary can conceivably grow without bound. Thus, it is necessary to consider data reduction techniques to reduce the resource consumption of the IBL system. Possible solutions include removal of instances from the dictionary and r-representation of instances in another, less space intensive, form. In this paper, we explore the use of clustering algorithms to reduce dictionary size. In this formdationl a group of similar instances is replaced with a sin~le exemDlar instance.
In the lest of (Ms paper, we examine methods for rep resenting the anom~y detection domain as an IBL task, including a temporal encoding of discrete data streams and a defition of sitiarity that encodes some aspects of temporal sequence data. We present a clustering technique for data reduction in this domain. We fish with an emDincd .
examination of performance at differentiating users under this learning scheme. There are a number of learning algorithms that are amenable to learning on spaces with nomind-vdued attributes, but they typicfly make the assumption of independence of attributes. For example, decision trees [Qui93] are we~suited to representing decision boundaries on discrete spaces. The bias used to search for such structues generdy employs a greedy search that examines each featme independently of M others. This bias ignores internal relations arising from causal structures in the data generating process.
One method of circumventing this difficdty is to convert the data to an atempord representation in which the causal structures are represented explicitly. Norton (1994) and Sdzberg (1995) each independently used such a techtique for the domain of learning to recognize coding regions in DNA fragments. DNA coding, wtie not temporal, does exhibit interrelations between positions that are diffitit for conventional learning systems to acquire directly. The featwes extracted from the DNA sequences were selected by domain experts, and cannot be genertized to other sequential domains. Nthough such an approach cotid be app~ed to the anomaly detection domain, it wotid require considerable effort on the part of a domain expert, and the developed features wodd apply ody to that data source. We are interested in developing techniques that can be appfied across Werent data sources and tasks.
OW approach is based on a sitiarity measure that transforms the native data format (a stream of discrete events) into a metric space. Classification is performed via an IBL technique that selects decision thresholds not on distance to members of different classes, but on probabihty of f~g within known patterns. In this section, we describe the similarity measure we employ and describe the classification procedure in the transformed space. We end with a descrip tion of several data reduction methods for this domain.
The Similarity Measure
Currently, our similarity measure treats ody sequences of tokens of equal, fied length. Tokens may be any symbok drawn from a discrete, fite, unordered alphabet (e.g. GUI events, UNIX command names, keystrokes, system c*, etc.). For a length, 1, the sitiarity between sequences X=(zo, zl,... ,zz_I) and Y= (ye, yI,... ,yl-1) is d&ed by the pair of tictions:
where w(X,~i) = O for i <0 so that w(X,~O) is wed efied when xo = yo) and
The converse measure} distance, is defined to be
The function w(X,~i) accumtiates weight Mearly~ong matching subsequences, and Sim(X, Y) is the integral of tt d weight over time. In the hmiting case of identicd sequences, this measure co~apses to SimmaX = Sim(X, X) = ?=l i =~. Thus, a run of contiguous matching tokens witi accumtiate a large similtity, wtie changing a single token in the midde of the run can greatly reduce the overfl similarity. This measure depends strongly on the interactions between adjacent tokens as we~as comparisons be tween corresponding tokens in the two sequences (i.e. tokens at the same offset, i, within each sequence). The sequence length, 1, is a user-dependent parameter and was explored in &B97a] where 1 = 10 w= found to be an acceptable compromise across users.
A user profle is a co~ection of sequences, D, selected from a user's observed actions. 1 The sitiarity between the profle and a newly observed sequence, X, is defined to be:
This fie is related to the l-nearest-neighbor classification tie, although we are not actudy performing classification at this stage but, rather, are detig sidarity to known pattm.
We examined the possibtity of using an average sidarity to the entire profle, but found that such a measure had much lower accuracy than the measure given here. Such an average decreases the abihty of the classfier to r~olve fin~structure pattern in the classification space.
The design of this sidarity measure was motivated by the observation that human-computer interaction is a fundamentdy causal procesq the computer responds to the human's request and the human, in turn, responds to the computer's output. Weighting of adjacent matches is an attempt to capture the short-term causal tiges in the user's input stream. Other sidarity measures for the anomaly de tection domain have been examined in~B97c], and it was shown that the similarity measure described here is effective for anomaly clmsification across a number of different profled users.
Segmenting the Event Stream
Becaw~eour sitiarity measure is defied ody for fixed length sequences, it is necessary to partition the raw event stream into component sequences. This raises the question of op tired sequence~gnments: where shotid each sequence be defied to start? Our approach is post hoc, initi~y segmenting the data stream into d possible overlapping sequences of length 1 (thereby replicating each token 1 times). Thus, every position, i, of the event stream is considered to be the starting point for a sequence of length 1 referred to as the .th sequence or the sequence at time step i. After instance 3 selection (see below), the sequences remaining in the profle are considered to define the desired &gnments.
Classification Procedure
The similarit.y-t~profle measure defies a transformation from the original, l-ary nomin~space to a on~dimensiond, red-vdued space in which a point set (command trace), T, appears as a probablhty distribution, PT over possible similarity values, u. Given sticiently accurate modek of the distribution of normal and abusive actions, we cotid simply construct a Bayes-optimd decision bomdary~uk90] and proceed with classification. Because we possess data ody from the profded user, the Bayes-optimd boundary is unobservable to us. Fmthermore, for most of the data sets we lThe question of guaranteeing that the observed history used to profile a user actually ori~nates \vith that user is a critical one, but \ve do not examine that problem here, instead tting the knov~n data to be accurate by assumption. have examined, the tinweighted Bayes-optimd thr-hold is overly critical of the profded user. In the example of Figure  1 , normal (U3) and anom~ous (U6) similarity distributions are displayed together with the Bayes-optimd classification threshold and an alternative possible classification threshold (the acceptable f~e alarm threshold, d~cribed below). Sequences whose sitiarity to the profle f~to the right of the classification threshold are labeled normal while points fflng to the left are labeled abnormal. The area under distribution U3 and to the left of the threshold is then the f~e alarm probability (the probabtity of the vtid user be ing f~ely accused of being anomdo~) while the area under distribution U6 and to the right of the threshold is the probabfity of f~ely accepting an anomalous user. In this example, employing the unweight ed Bayes-optimd threshold for classification yields an unacceptably high f~e alarm rate. In tight of these considerations, we must seek another method for selecting a decision boundary. Conveniently, the constraints of our domain provide us with a practical heurit ic: reduce the f&e dorm rate. For a given profle, D, we choose an 'acceptable' f&e alarm rate, r, and set the decision boundaries according to the tie:
where u is the similarity of a sequence to be classified to D, 1 denotes 'normal', and O denotes 'anomrdous'. Acceptable f~e alarm rate is a sitespecific value, defined by security poficy.
In practice, we have found that the similarity stream, produced by comparing an input data stream to a profde, is far too noisy for effective classification (Figure 2, (a) ). We attribute the high degree of noise to natural variations in the user's actions and patterns. For example, the user may temporarily suspend writing a paper to ded with urgent incoming email, thus disrupting his or her standard paper writing routine. Such a disruption wiH appear as a spuriously low similarity spike within an over~high similarity period. A time average of the similarity signal yields a much more stable data stream (Figure 2, (b) ). We there fore employ a noise reduction falter before selecting decision thresholds or performing classification. For the work described here, we employ a traihng window mean v~ue flter ' ' i=j-~+1
where SimD(i) is the similarity of the ith token sequence to the user profde D, W is the window length, and VD(j) is the fid v~ue of sequence j with respect to D. A smd W is desirable because the window length defies the minimum time before any detection can occur. While a great ded of damage can be ificted in less than the window length, such short term attacks can be more readily handed by matching known attack signatmes~S94]. We are primarily concerned here with the class of long-tern, low-profle attacks such as resource theft or industrid data theft.
Storage Reduction: Instance Selection
A widely acknowledged weakness of instance-based learning dgonthms is the large data storage requirement for accurate classtication. A number of techniques have been examined for reducing this memory overhead, many of whch are re viewed by Wikon and Martinez (1997) . In an operational setting, data reduction is critical as the size of the data directly impacts the time required for classification. We note, fit, that the chosen sifiarity measure selects ody a single historical sequence as most simflar to a given input sequence. If we assume that the characteristics of a user's behavior change relatively slowly, we can invoke locality of reference to predict that recently matched dictionary sequences wi~be used again for detection in the near future. This suggests an analogy to tasks in operating systems, such as page replacement, in which some resources must be rl eased in favor of others.
To examine this analogy, we implemented the least-recentlyused (LRU) pruning strategy. As new instances are acquired and classification is performed, the profde instance selected m most simflar is time-stamped. The profle is constrained to the desired size by removing the least-recentlyused sequences. By analogy, we &o constructed and tested the pruning heuristics FIFO (equivalent to preserving the most recently stored n sequences), LIFO (preserve the oldest n sequences), and LFU (remove least frequently used sequences). In other work, &B97b], we have examined the properties of each of these methods. We found that instance 153 m selection cotid rdably reduce the data storage requirements with smd or no accuracy losses. The best =tance selection method was found to be user dependent.
Storage Reduction: Clustering
A second method of reducing data storage is to modify the representation of sets of points within the data space. For example, S&berg (1991) represented sets of points as hyperrectangles. We propose a greedy clustering dgonthm which btids individud clusters consecutively, attempting to minimize the criterion.
for each duster C. This measure is a generdzation of the mean inter-clmter distance employed for clustering~uk90]. From an initial seed point, the cluster is grown incrementdy by including the point that increases vd(C) the least, untfl the hating criterion is reached. Growth is halted when the cluster value reaches a Iocd minimum. Because, in some cases, the cluster value monotorucdy approaches Slm~aX, the halting criterion we actudy use is that the fit derivative of vd(C) be within &of Ofor some (empticfly selected) value of e. As each sequence is added to a cluster, it is rm oved from the set of avtiable sequences. When the cluster is complete, we defie the center of the cluster, Ccent, to be the point possessing the minimum total distance to d other points in C. The similarity between a sequence, X, and a cluster is then Sim(X, CCe.t).
In practice, we have found that this cluster selection dalgorithmis somewhat too lenient -it accepts points that decrease the cluster's effectiveness in classification. We solve this in a manner analogous to the pruning process employed in decision tree learning [Qui93] . After growing a single cluster to completion according to the halting criterion, the clustering dgonthm removes outlying points and returns them to the pool of available sequences (so that they have the possibihty of contributing to different clusters). Our pruning function removes points from the cluster that ffl outside the cluster mean radius -i.e. points whose distance to the center is greater than the mean distance to the center of fl points in the cluster. Points f~ng within the mean radius are discarded and removed from further consideration and the fid cluster is represented ody by its center and mean radius. Because similarity to a cluster is computed ody in terms of the cluster center, we redze substantial space savings by discarding fl duster elements other than the center.
The complete clustering dgonthm is structurdy similar to the single cluster construction algorithm. We sequenti~y select individud clusters by their abfity to maximize the analog of mean intra-cluster distance: nn vrd{cl, c2, . . . , C~} =~~Dist (Ci,ce.t, Cj,ce.t).
i=l j=l
In this case, we found the single cluster halting criterion to be ineffective because, typicfly, d of a data set's points were exhaust ed before the derivative of the intra-cluster dit ance approached O. When we dewed the clustering prC eSSto absorb~available points, many of the clusters were found to either not contribute to classification accuracy or to be activdy h-.
ktead, we hrdt the clustering prc ess when the the minimum inter-cluster value of fl current dusters f~below a threshold, C. Currently, we select C empiric~y.
Empirical Evaluation
In this section we describe the requirements for an anomaly detection system and the measures that we use to characterize our tetique in terms of those requirements. We proceed to present summaries of our experimental restits, characterizing the data sets (users) for which our approach is successti. Findy, we demonstrate that the greedy clustering dgorit.hm is effective in reducing profle size while maintaining accuracy, but that K-cent ers clustering is unable to do so in this domain.
Performance Criteria
The god in the anomaly detection task is to identify potentidy mdcious occurrences w~e f~ely flagging innocuous actions as rarely as possible. We shfl denote the rate of incorrectly flagging normal behaviom as the false alarm rate and the rate of fting to identify abnormal or mdcious be haviors as the false acceptance rate. Under the n~hypoth-esis that d behavior is normal, these correspond to type I and type II errors, respectively. For the detector to be practical, it is important that the f~e rdarm rate be low. Users and security officers wi~quitiy learn to ignore the 'security system that cried WOW,' if it flags innocuous behavior too often. Findy, a practical security system must be resource-conservative in both space and time. The god of security is to enhance productivity, not inhibit it through consumption of system resources.
Detection accuracy does not, however, reveal the W story. A second issue of importance is time to detection. This quantity is defined to be the average time between when the detector is initialized and when it flags an anomdow condition, and is a me=ure of how qui~y an anom~ous or hostile situation can be detected. In the cme of f~e alarms, the time to detection represents the average time from inititization until a false alarm occurs. Thus, we wish the time to detection to be short for hostile users so that they can be dedt with qui&y and before doing much harm, but long for the v~d user so that normal work is interrupted by frdse alarms as seldom as possible.
Because we are examining command fine data in this work (see below), we measure d detection times in token counts rather than WM clock time. Token count is more nearly correlated with the quantity of interest -how much damage can be accomplished by a hostile user before detection -than is WW clock time.
Comparison to Current Anomaly Detection Systems
Basefining our restits relative to other we~known anomaly detection systems such as (N)IDES &J8s, Lun90], HAYSTACK [SmaSS] , and NSM~DLt90] proved to be impossible. The descriptions of these systems tend to focus on architecture and omit performance measures. Sptiord [Spa9S] reports being unaware of the publication of any performance measures for intrusion and anomaly detection systems other than IDIOT~um95] in refereed forums. IDIOT is an intrusion detection system which employs a pattern matching algorithm to detect known attack signatures in audit data. Its patterns are not intended to generfize to unknown cases, so rather than accuracy, time and space performance measures are reported.
Data
Of the hterdy thousands of possible data sources and features that might characterize a system or user, we chose to examine UNIX shefl command data. The UNIX operattig system is widely used and has been extensively studied in both the security and operating systems communities. The user environment is higMy configurable with a rich command language and permits a large range of possible behaviors. In the UNIX model, most user interactions take place through a command he environment (a she~), so command data is strongly reflective of user activities. Finfly, there are available mechanisms to make co~ection of she~command data convenient in the UNIX environment.
Lacking she~traces of actual misuse or intrusive behaviors, we demonstrate the behavior of the detection system on the task of differentiating different authorized users of the UNIX hosts in the Purdue MILLENNIUM machine learning lab. In this framework, an anom~ous situation is simtiated by testing one legitimate user's command data against another legitimate user's profde. This framework simtiates ody a subset of the possible misuse scenarios -that of a naive intruder gaining access to an unauthorized accountbut it~ows us to evaluate the approach. It is to be hoped that the "naive intruder" scenario constitutes a large enough fraction of fl attacks that progress in this domain win be of practical benefit. Nonetheless, we acknowledge our inability to generfize these resdt to broader detitions of abuses until we are able to test these techniques against red misuse data.
We have acquired she~command data from eight different UNIX users over the course of more than a year. The data events were toketized into an intern~format usable by the anomaly detector. In this phase, command names and behavioral switches were preserved, but fde names were omitted under the assumption that behavioral patterns are at least approximately invariant across fle names. The pattern 'vi <file> gcc <file> a. out', for example, represents the same class of action regardess of whether <file> is homeworkl. c or cluster. c. The amount of data available varied among the users from just over 15,000 tokens to weU over 100,000 tokens, depending on their work rates and when each user entered and left the study. For tiformity in testing, we selected the earhest fin calendar time) 15,000 tokens from each user, representing an average of approximately six months of usage per person. 
Unc[ustered Profile Results
Each user's data was spht into separate train set (1,500 tk ens), parameter selection set (1,500) tokens, and test set (12,000 tokens). Each train set was then used as the basis for a profde, and the classification boundaries were selected according to the distribution of the parameter selection data with respect to the profle. Finfly, f~e accept and f&e alarm rates were generated for each profle md each test set. We present the resdts in Table 1 for the best global choice of parameters. The values along the main diagond of this table are generated by comparison of a user to his or her profde and represent percent true acceptance. The offdiagond elements are generated by testing one user against a Werent user's profde and represent percent true detections. These restits were achieved with acceptable f~e darrn rate r = 2%, sequence length Z = 10, and mean fltering with window length W = 21 sequences. Note that if we vary the parameters on a per-user b=is we can achieve higher accuracies.
A number of points are key in this table. First, the main diagond (correct classifications of the vdd user) is uniformly high. For six of the users the achieved se~-detection accuracy is lower than the 98~o specified by the chosen acceptable f~e alarm rate. This is a resdt of the parameter selection data (used for decision threshold selection) failing to reflect the true distribution of the user's behaviors. This problem &o leads to increased f~e accept rates. The most dramatic Nustration of this problem is visible in user 5's profde. On examination of user 5's command data, we discovered that the user had largely changed tasks between generation of the training and threshold selection data (from tasks concerned maidy with system maintenance to prg ramming tasks). In this case, the particdar skew of the parameter estimation data resdted in an extremely wide range of similarities, yielding decision thresholds that classified nearly everything as the vfid user. The overly lenient decision boundaries *O produced a spuriously high seKdetection accuracy.
A second source of f~e accept error is demonstrated in Figure 3 . Here, U1 (the v~d user) and U7 have many behaviors in common -mostly 'generic' account maintñ ance such as directory creation and fle copy and remove operations. This high degree of sitiarity is reflected in the substantial overlaps in the sitiarity distributions, making differentiation impossible within this space. By contrast, U3 was engaged m~y in programming and writing during this time. There are two possible sources for the degree of overlap between U1 and U7. First, the underlying observations do not encode sticient information to distinguish the two users. Nlany other data sources are avtiable for user prf ig and codd be used in conjunction with the techniques
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Figure 3: F*e accept erro~U7'S data bears high resemblance to the profled user's (Ul).
presented here in an operational security system.2 The second, and more fundament d, source of error is in the similarity measure itse~. The measure presented in this paper is fairly coarse (having ody 0(12) possible v~ues for a se quence length of 1), and modek ordy a single type of tempr d interaction. We are currently investigating more sophisticated similarity measures such as edit distance [CLN2].
Wme to Detection
As explained previously (Section 4.1), we &o wish to examine the mean time to detection for the base system. We measured detection times on data from the same users t~ted above, with f~e alarm rate r = 2Y0, sequence length 1 = 10 tokens, and smoothing window length W = 81 sequences. The longer window length improves over~time to detection figures and is presented here to demonstrate potentidy achievable times. The relation between window length and time to detection is covered in more detail in &anar]. For re=ons of time, sm~er subsets of the avtiable data were chosen, with 5,000 tokens devoted to training, 1,000 to parameter selection, and 1,000 to test.3 A larger training set was chosen to mitigate the effects of behavioral changes that we see in the previous section, by representing a larger range of behaviors in the user profle. Time to detection values for d profde/test pairs are given in Table 2 . Here we wish the values to be high for a user tested against him or herse~(indicating infrequent f~e alarms), but smd for other pairings (indicating rapid detection of anomalous circumstances on average). Thus, we desire large values on the main diagond of the table, and smd values off the diagonal. Delays in time to dt ection introduced by the sequence length (1 = 10 tokens, see Section 2.1) and the noise suppression smoothing window (W= 81 sequences, see Section 2.3) have been omitted from this table, as they represent constant factors across W tests.
2A number of such data sources~e described in~en87, LJ8S, Sma88, HDL+90].
31n the extended version of this paper, we \vill present unified results under the same parameter settings used above, though \ve expect such changes to have little impact on the gene~nature of the results. We see from Table 2 that the detection system is displaying desirable behaviors. In general, the time to detection for the profled user (i.e. time to generation of a f~e alarm, appearing on the main diagond) is long rdative to time to detection for dtemate users against that profle (i.e. time to detection of an anomaly, in the non-diagond demerits and reading column-wise).
T-ted Profiled User User
Examination of the raw classification data reve& that the time to detections are not equident to the (inveme) mean detectiom per unit time. Specificdy, the f&e alarms tend to occur in tight clusters interspersed between long strings of true accepts, yidding an overd long time to de tection for the true user. me detections, on the other hand, tend to be more evedy distributed, yidding a shorter expected time to detection. Indeed, in many casa, time to detection is 0.0, indicating that, on average, the anomalous situation is detected in l+W = 91 tokens, the minimum pos ible time. Thus, this detection system is bi=ed toward de tecting anomrdous conditions quickly, while generating f~e alarms in rare clusters. This type of behavior is desirable because a vtid user wishes to be bothered as fittle as possible and a tight group of f&e alarms can be investigated and disregarded as a group, while a mticious user cart be discovered qui~y from ody a sin~e true alarm.
Clustering Techniques
To examine the effectiveness of the greedy clustering dgñ thm, we produced clustered versions of d of the user prf l~from the fit experiment (Section 4.4) for various values of C (the clustering halting threshold). As basefine comparison, we implemented the K-centers clustering algorithm. K-centers is an iterative clustering dgorithrn that attempts to make class assignments to 1{ different clusters simdtaneously through gradient descent on the log-hkebhood parameter space, and is a special case of the EM (expectation maximization) dgonthrn,~p96].4 Table 3 shows the average and stadard deviation of f~e alarm rate for each user (U&U7) and clust enng method. These values were ob tained with greedy clustering halting criteria ranging across the values c = 0.005 (single cluster) and C c {0.25, 0.5, 0.75} (W clusters). K-centers was given 1( E {50, 75, 100} and dallowed to run 10,000 iteratiom. N algorithms were run for both mean and median falters.
We see that the f&e darrn rates are generdy low and that greedy clustering matches or outperforms k-centers clustering for five of the users. Both clustering methods have higher f~e alarm rates than does uncluttered.
4K-centers is closelyrelatedto K-means,but requiresthat theclut er exemplarbe dravmfrom the clustermembersratherthan being an interpolationof them. For vecto= of unordered,discreteelements (such as UNE commands), no mean tiue is available, so the exemplar must be a cluster element. The relative f~e accept rates of the uncluttered and greedy clustering approaches are displayed in Figure 4 . Here, the f&e accept rate for greedy clustering appears on the vertical axis while the rate for uncluttered appears on the horizontal. Each plotted point is a single user/profle pair and the diagond fine indicates equal performance. Points to the left of the hne indicate superior performance by the uncluttered technique, while those below denote higher performance by greedy clustering. We see that most points fd fairly close to the hne, indicating that greedy clustering generfly incurs ody a sm~accuracy hit. Mitigating the loss of accuracy is data reductio~for these parameters, greedy clustering achieved an average of 70% reduction. Because the classification~gorithm runs in time O(n]Dl) for a n input sequences and a profle cent aining ID I instant=, we expect to obtain a corresponding 70% improvement in classification speed. In practice, we found that classification of the entire 12,000 token test set on a Spare~tra 1 required four minutes without clustering, but ody one minute with.5
While the greedy clustering dgonthm typicdy formed over 200 clust em per profle, we found that K-centers did not converge to an acceptable solution in a reasonable period of time (10,000 iterations) for 1< = 200. 1( = 100 aso did not halt, but did achieve somewhat higher performance than did 1< = 200. Its false accept error rate, averaged across~users, parameters, and fltering methods, (77.o%) is dramaticdy worse than either that of greedy clustering 'Amortized across the entire six-month period of the test data, this represents Iess than t~vo thousandths of a percent of the CPU'S time.
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..- (67.0%) or no clustering (66.6%). We note, in passing, that the clusters constructed by the greedy clustering algorithm make intuitive sense, in terms of the actions being performed by the underlying sequences. For example, we have identified clusters that correspond to 'programming', 'paper writing', 'reading email', and 'navigating directories'.
Profiled User Clustering

Conclusions and Future Work
This work has demonstrated a technique for mapping the temporal data occurring in the anomaly detection task onto a space in which IBL learning can be formdated. The restits demonstrate that this technique can be usefd in such tasks when the underlying data supports sficient class separation. Furthermore, the system is biased toward detecting anomalous condtions quickly, but generating false alarms rarely. We showed a new clustering technique based on S* quentid, greedy selection of clusters. The greedy clustering technique was able to produce a large saving in storage rquirements, with an over~sm~loss in accuracy. K-centers clustering was unable to match the performance of greedy clust enng in this domain in either convergence rate or de tection accuracy.
While the algorithm reported here is probably insticient for standalone anomaly detection, there are a number of ways in which it codd easily be augmented to improve accuracy and decrease time to detection. We are currently examining other sitiarity measures for the anomaly detection domain based on edit distance and on hidden Markov modek of behavioral patterns. More sophisticated similarity memures wotid Wely improve class separabihty and, there fore, system accuracy. We are *O examining the effects of changes in user behaviors over time. As noted in Section 4.4, a change in user behaviors between gathering the user profle and employing it for user classification can lead to an extremely distorted and inaccurate picture of the user's typical behaviors. We are developing techniques to dynamicdy adapt the profde to user changes over time, yet not adopt fluctuations arising from hostile or anomalous activities. We note, too, that the techniques developed here are intended to be task independent and we employed Ettle de main knowledge in their design. By adding a greater degree of a priori knowledge (e.g. on the advice of a site security specidst), system performance codd hkely be improved yet further.
The system presented here possesses a number of parametem that must be set: sequence length, 1, target false alarm rate, r, noise suppression window length, W, and greedy cluster halting criteria e and C. The resdts presented here apply single parameter settings to fi users and profles simtit aneously. We have found that there is a significant impact of parameter settings on both detection accuracy and time to detection. If the parameters can be properly set on a per-profle b=is, then global acmacy can doubtless be futher improved. We are currently investigating methods for automaticdy adapting system parameters to the profled user.
Flnfly, the dgonthms employed here cotid be implemented as single detection elements in an over~anomaly detection scheme that *O employs dtemative data sources such as biometric measurements, resource consumption measurements, and activity time-of-day. Such ensemble classification methods are we~known in the machine learning commtity,
[Sch94], and the body of theory surrounding them there cotid be directly apphed to this domain.
In summary, we have presented a machine learning oriented approach to anomaly detection.
We have demonstrated that it is possible to learn to distin@sh anomalous behavior patterns from normal under this type of framework. We befieve that, in general, both the computer security and machine learning communities can benefit from further interactions. The ML community has studied many pattern recognition techniques which cotid be valuable to a variety of sectity problems, while computer security tasks present a number of chdenging issu~that can motivate new research directions for the machine learning community.
